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INDIANA, 1851, ALASKA, 1956: A CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOSt
Despite America's traditional regard for constitutions and constitu-
tionalism, serious students of government have frequently bemoaned our
lack of an ideal state constitution. This is not to say that efforts have
not been made to overcome this deficiency. With the adoption of the
first Model State Constitution by the National Municipal League in 1921
the way was opened to a host of models, proposals, recommendations,
and even modernized state constitutions-New York (1938), Georgia
and Missouri (1945), and New Jersey (1947).
Those who demand constitutional revision generally point to the
length of the typical state constitution and the inclusion of much detail
which makes the fundamental law inflexible and acts as an obstruction to
effective government. Although it was reported a decade ago that con-
stitutional revision was "a live issue" in a third of the states, older states
have not made noteworthy progress in that direction. Today's pioneer
in constitution-building is Alaska, the newest American state.
Embodied in the Alaska Constitution' are 180 years of accumulated
American experience in'constitution-making, the advice of American
political scientists,2 and provisions which "fit the special needs and tradi-
tions of Alaska."3 While the constituent assembly did not lose sight of
certain traditional assumptions underlying American constitutions (lim-
ited government, popular sovereignty, and power diffusion), it was also
influenced by recent thought regarding government (e.g., executive-
t Acting Director of the Institute of Training for Public Service, and Lecturer in
Government, Indiana University.
1. In November 1955, fifty-five (reminiscent of the same number at the Phila-
delphia Convention in 1787) men and women met at the University of Alaska as the
Territory's constituent assembly. Their work was completed on February 6, 1956, and,
in a popular referendum on April 24, 1956, the draft received the approval of the people.
Now that Congress has acted favorably on the Alaska statehocd measure, the new Con-
stitution will enter into force.
2. E. R. Bartley, University of Florida; J. E. Bebout, National Municipal League;
Weldon Cooper, University of Virginia; Sheldon Elliot, New York University; D. D.
McKean, University of Colorado; Vincent Ostrom, University of Oregon; Kimbrough
Owen, Louisiana State University; and Emil Sady, Public Administration Service.
3. Statement of the convention quoted by J. E. Bebout in Charter for the Last
Frontier, 45 NAT'L MuNIc. REv. 158 (1956). An example of "special needs and tradi-
tions" is found in the provisions on natural resources, ALASKA CONST. art. VIII.
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administrative, executive-legislative, and intergovernmental relation-
ships).'
A study of the Alaska Constitution and the current Indiana Con-
stitution, enacted in 1851, reveals some interesting developments in fun-
damental ideas. For purposes of comparison the following matters will
be considered: (1) Civil Rights and Social Welfare; (2) Executive-
Legislative Relationships; (3) Executive-Administrative Relations;
(4) the Judiciary; (5) Popular Participation in the Political Processes;
(6) Local Governmental Units and Powers; (7) Finance and Taxation;
and (8) the Amending Processes.
I. Civil Rights and Social Welfare
The worldwide influence of ideas about "social" and "economic"
democracy on post-war constituent assemblies is obvious. For example,
in 1946 the French Constitutional Convention described certain political,
social and economic principles as "most vital" in the present day. These
principles included guarantees "to obtain employment," "to organize,"
"to strike," and to secure "protection of health, material security, rest
and leisure."5  Another example of the trend toward "welfare state"
constitutions is the American-sponsored Japanese Constitution of 1947.
In it are found guarantees to "minimum standards of wholesome and cul-
tured living,"' to the maintenance by law of standards "for wages, hours,
rest and other working conditions," 7 and for the right of workers to
organize, bargain, and act collectively.'
Inclusion of "welfare state" concepts has not been a purely foreign
development. The few American constituent assemblies, which have met
in the last two decades, have "modernized" their state constitutions by
including similar provisions. For instance, the Model State Constitution
and the new Missouri and New Jersey constitutions include right to
4. The Constitution reflects the increasing use of federal grants-in-aid, federal-
local cooperative endeavors, and interstate compacts. "The State and its political sub-
divisions may cooperate with the United States and its territories, and with other
states and their political sub-divisions on matters of common interest. The respective
legislative bodies may make appropriations for this purpose." ALASKA CONST. art. XII,
§2.
5. The French included the bill of rights in the preamble, a choice made necessary
by extreme differences of opinion in the assembly. Since it was composed of a mili-
tantly collectivistic left and an equally militant individualistic right, the assembly could
not agree on the statement of rights. To break the impasse the controversial "rights"
were included in the preamble instead of the operative part of the text.
6. JAPANESE CoNsT. art. 25. It further states, "In all spheres of life, the State
shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security,
and of public health."
7. JAPANESE CoNsT. art. 27.
8. JAPANESE CoNsT. art. 28.
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organize clauses.' And the modernized state constitutions have other pro-
visions, subsumed under public welfare headings, which are far more
elaborate than those found in state constitutions of a century ago. Thus,
provisions for public health,"0 public relief," and public housing 2 are
found in recently adopted or revised American constitutions.
This inclusion of social and economic rights in these several state
constitutions meant that constituent assemblies were exercising legisla-
tive functions. The purpose was obvious: liberals did not want to lose
the gains that they had made in the last quarter century. Knowing that
a rightward swing was possible, even inevitable, and knowing further
that constitutions are more difficult to change than statutes, the liberal-
oriented constituent assemblies wove welfare state concepts into the
constitutional fabric.
In view of the influence of newer ideas about social and economic
democracy, the absence of social and economic "rights" from the Alaska
Constitution is noteworthy. That recent social philosophies did not in-
fluence the Alaskans is one possible explanation for the absence of social
and economic "rights." However, it is not the only plausible answer.
The constituent assembly deliberated with the Congress in mind, and
it may have regarded recent conservative trends as a warning not to
create a document which would be unacceptable to Congress." There is
yet another possible explanation: the constituent assembly may have de-
cided that socio-economic ills cannot be removed by constitutional fiat;
that these problems and their remedies are more suitably within the do-
main of the legislature.
9. That labor's historic struggle was considered is apparent in such provisions as
"Citizens shall have the right to organize, except in military or semi-military organiza-
tions not under the supervision of the state, and except for purposes of resisting the
duly constituted authority of this state or of the United States. Persons in private
employment shall have the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing." MODEL STATE CONsT. art. I, § 103. The New Jersey Constitution has a simi-
lar clause which states that people "in private employment shall have the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively." Art. I, § 19. See also Mo. ColTsT. art. I, § 29.
10. MoDEL STATE CONST. art. X, § 1001; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 3.
11. MAss. CoNsT. art. XLVII; MODEL STATE CONsT. art. X, § 1002; N.Y. CoNsT.
art. XVII, § 1.
12. MODEL STATE CONST. art. X, § 1004; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1.
13. That the assembly did deliberate with one eye on Congress is apparent in its
consideration of unicameralism. Bebout notes that a proposal for a single chamber was
defeated, at least partly, "by the feeling that the Congress might view a unicameral
legislature with some misgivings." In regard to unicameralism Bebout attaches sig-
nificance to "a number of provisions for action by the two houses sitting together as one
body, as, for example, to consider vetoes by the governor." Bebout, supra note 3, at
162. The provision for joint sessions to reconsider vetoed measures is found in article
II, section 16. If there is indeed strong sentiment for a single legislative chamber,
Alaskans may take action in that direction now that the United States Congress is no
longer an obstacle to statehood.
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Thus the Alaska Constitution does not differ greatly from Indiana's
in this matter of public welfare. The emphasis is not on additional func-
tions for government but on changing the locus of responsibility. While
poor relief and poor farms were historically the responsibility of local
governmental units,14 the Alaska Constitution imposes this obligation on
the state legislature." Responsibility for public health is similarly
placed."
The Bill of Rights 7 in the Alaska Constitution restates traditional
substantive and procedural rights. Except that Alaskans stated theirs in
fewer provisions and less detail than did the Hoosiers of a century ago,"8
there is no marked difference in content. The Alaska convention de-
pended upon brief, generally worded provisions similar to those found
in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. For example,
the provision for freedom of religion in the Alaska Constitution encom-
passes but one sentence in contrast to the more detailed sections in its
Hoosier counterpart. This difference is apparent in the following
comparison:
Freedom of Religion
Indiana Constitution, Article 1- Alaska Constitution, Article 1-
Sec. 2. All men shall be se- Sec. 4. No law shall be made
cured in the natural right to wor- respecting an establishment of re-
ship Almighty God, according to ligion, or prohibiting the free ex-
the dictates of their own consci-. ercise thereof.
ences.
Sec. 3. No law shall, in any
case whatever, control the free
exercise and enjoyment of reli-
gious opinions, or interefere with
the rights of conscience.
Sec. 4. No preference shall be
given, by law, to any creed, reli-
14. When society took over responsibility for relief from charitable agencies, lo-
cal government administered the poor relief laws. This is still evident in Indiana where
the Township Trustee administers poor relief in his area. And the Indiana Constitu-
tion lodged the power in county boards "to provide farms, as an asylum for those per-
sons, who, by reason of age, infirmity, or other misfortune, have claims upon the sym-
pathies and aid of society." Art. 9, § 3.
15. ALASKA CoNsT. art. VII, § 5.
16. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4.
17. ALASKA CoNST. art. I, §§ 1-21.
18. IND. Coi'sT. art. 1, §§ 1-37.
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gious society, or mode of worship;
and no man shall be compelled to
attend, erect, or support, any place
of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, against his consent.
See. 5. No religious test shall be
required, as a qualification for
any office of trust or profit.
Sec. 6. No money shall be
drawn from the treasury, for the
benefit of any religious or theo-
logical institution.
Sec. 7. No person shall be ren-
dered incompetent as a witness,
in consequence of his opinions on
matters of religion.
While the provisions for substantive rights in the two constitutions
are similar in meaning, if not in length, some differences can be noted
in the procedural safeguards. For example, the Hoosier constituent as-
sembly did not make provision in the Bill of Rights for indictment by
grand jury, although, by implication, the grand jury system was re-
tained. Reference was made to it in oblique fashion: the judiciary
article authorized the general assembly to "modify, or abolish, the grand
jury system."' 0  On the other hand, the Alaska Constitution, employing
language similar to that of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution, maintains the indictment as a procedural safeguard. It
does, however, permit the accused to waive indictment, in which case
prosecution will be by information."
That the Alaska constituent assembly would preserve the common
law rule of trial by a jury of twelve in criminal cases was a foregone con-
clusion.' That it would make exceptions in cases of petty offenses triable
in courts not of record, where the minimum number of jurors may be set
at six by statute,2 2 was to be expected in view of similar practices else-
19. INn. CONST. art. 7, § 17. The Indiana Constitution of 1816 in its statement on
procedural safeguards called for "prosecutions by indictment, or presentment." Art. 1,
§ 13. And in the judiciary article there was additional reference to indictments. Art.
5, § 2.
20. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 8.
21. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 11.
22. Ibid.
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where in the United States.23 But, that the common law rule of trial by
jury of twelve is retained in civil cases is perhaps surprising in view of the
costs of jury trials in money and time. True, the Alaska assembly did set
the "amount in controversy" at two hundred and fifty dollars,24 a much
higher requirement than that demanded in the seventh amendment of the
United States Constitution. Yet even this amount is not great " and
parties to relatively unimportant suits are permitted the luxury of a trial
by jury. The Alaska constituent assembly did authorize the legislature to
depart from the common law rule of unanimity in civil cases,2" and to
provide for a jury of not less than six in courts not of record. While
the jury trial in criminal cases is a safeguard that cannot be treated frivo-
lously, the jury trial in civil suits may yet become a leading procedural
problem.
In enumerating traditional rights and safeguards, and in excluding
guarantees of a social or economic nature, the Alaska Constitution reveals
no marked departure from the past. Perhaps, at most it offers a wel-
come conservation of words. However, in its organic features, and in
its considerations of relationships between branches of government, dif-
ferences rather than similarities must be noted.
II. Executive-Legislative Relationships
Because of colonial distrust of executives, early state constitutions
established the legislature as the dominant branch. Legislative suprem-
acy persisted until several other factors were introduced into the political
picture: (1) the passage of time brought ever-increasing functions to
government; (2) the limited annual or biennial legislative sessions made
legislators part-time officials, whereas the governor was on the job year
23. See, e.g., the Arizona Constitution which authorizes a jury of less than twelve
in courts not of record, art. II, § 23; the California Constitution, which, as amended in
1928, provides for a jury of less than twelve if both parties agree in open court, art. I,
§ 7; the Colorado Constitution, which, as amended in 1944, permits a lesser number in
courts not of record, art. II, § 23; and the Idaho Constitution which was amended in
1934 to provide that in cases of misdemeanor the jury shall consist of not more than
six, art. I, § 7.
24. ALASKA CowsT. art I, § 16.
25. Idaho makes it possible for a jury of six to deal with civil suits in which the
amount in controversy does not exceed five hundred dollars. IDAHO CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
26. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16. A future legislature may decree that a verdict be
by three-fourths of the jury. IDAHO CONsT. art. I, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23.
27. ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 16.
28. David W. Peck, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the New York
State Supreme Court, First Department, offers expert testimony on the inherent slow-
ness and costliness of jury trials in civil cases. He recommends that civil suits be tried
by the judge. Peck, Do Juries Delay Justice:?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1955, § 6 (Maga-
zine), p. 8. See also Peck, Court Organization and Procedures to Meet the Needs of
Modern Society, 33 IND. L.J. 182 (1958).
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around; (3) the executive presented an integrated front, while the multi-
member legislature represented diffusion of leadership; (4) unsuccssful
economic ventures by states brought legislators under popular wrath;
and (5) land speculation and legislative favoritism destroyed popular
reliance on that branch. These factors contributed directly to the chang-
ing role of state executives.
The increasingly important political and administrative roles of the
governor have also reflected developments in modern business. The latter
had experimented with organizational ideas to increase the efficiency of
complex industrial units, and these ideas were carried into government.
The change as it affected state executives was slow in development, be-
ginning with certain power accretions such as the veto power,29 but was
steady and reached its present high in this century. This changed em-
phasis is recognized in the Alaska Constitution. At present one can
only speculate on the relative advantages that will be enjoyed by the
branches of government and conclude that the governor of Alaska will
probably occupy a position of superiority in his relations with the legis-
lature. The legislative branch does have important constitutional checks
on the executive, such as unlimited annual sessions,3" and interim legisla-
tive committees ;1 but the executive's counter-checks in six areas would
seem to be more effective, especially in the hands of a strong governor.
These are: (1) special sessions called and controlled by the governor;
(2) the veto power; (3) the item veto; (4) time for consideration of
legislative acts; (5) legislative reapportionment; and (6) administrative
reorganization.
By referring to the following comparison, the relative power bases
of the Indiana and Alaska chief executives with respect to special ses-
sions can be noted:
Special Sessions
Indiana Constitution, Article 4- Alaska Constitution, Article II-
Sec. 9. . . But if, in the Sec. 9. Special sessions may be
opinion of the Governor, the pub- called by the governor or by vote
lic welfare shall require it, he of two-thirds of the legislators.
29. Some Americans may be of the opinion that the veto power has always been
held by American state governors. Actually only two states, Georgia and New Hamp-
shire, had veto provisions in their constitutions before 1789; by 1812 eight states made
provision for veto power. For a historical study of the evolution of the veto, see Pres-
cott, The Executive Veto in American States, 3 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 98
(1950).
30. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 8.
31. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
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may, at any time, by proclama- The vote may be conducted by the
tion, call a special session, legislative council or as prescribed
by law. At special sessions called
by the governor, legislation shall
be limited to subjects designated
in his proclamation calling the ses-
sion or the subjects presented by
him ...
The key difference is found in the last sentence of the Alaska provision
which limits discussion and action to the subjects designated in the gov-
ernor's proclamation. This is not the case in Indiana. In 1911 the Su-
preme Court ruled, "The power of the General Assembly to legislate on
any subject when convened in special session is not limited by the Con-
stitution." 2  And in 1951 former Governor Henry F. Schricker dis-
covered the verity of this when he called the general assembly into spe-
cial session to obtain the repeal of the "anti-secrecy" amendment 8 to
the Public Welfare Act of 1936."4 During that special session over sixty-
five legislative proposals and resolutions were introduced by members
of the general assembly.3" It is doubtful that the legislature should have
unrestrained freedom in discussion and action during a special session.
If, as was indicated by the introduction of so great a number of propo-
sals in the 1951 special session, additional time is necessary for considera-
tion of needed legislation, then the Indiana Constitution should be
amended to provide for unlimited, annual sessions. 6
Another area in which differences appear is the governor's veto
power. Both constitutions require an affirmative vote of a majority
32. Woesner v. Bullock, 176 Ind. 166, 169, 93 N.E. 1057, 1058 (1911). The court
found a constitutional basis for its ruling in article 4, section 9.
33. Ind. Acts 1951, ch. 321, § 1, at 1084-086. During the regular session that year
the amendment had been adopted over the governor's veto. Since this amendment con-
flicted with provisions of federal law, grant-in-aid funds for Indiana were withheld by
Oscar Ewing, the Federal Security Administrator. It was for the purpose of recover-
ing these funds that Governor Schricker called the special session and sought the amend-
ment's repeal. This provision was amended in 1955, Ind. Acts 1955, ch. 206, § 1, at 549-
50 and now appears in IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1260 (Burns Supp. 1957).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1001 to -1418 (Burns 1951).
35. IND. S. Joun. passim (1951 Spec. Sess.); IND. H.R. JouR. passim (1951 Spec.
Sess.)
36. In the 1957 session State Senator Bitz proposed two amendments to the Con-
stitution, the one to provide for annual sessions of the general assembly, the'other for
sessions of one hundred and fifty days' duration. His two resolutions, Senate Joint
Resolutions, Nos. 3 and 4, were considered by Judiciary B, the so-called "graveyard"
committee, and were reported out without recommendations. The Indiana Constitution
presently provides for biennial sessions limited in duration to sixty-one days. Art. 4,§§ 9, 29.
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of the membership of each house to adopt legislative measures," but
different majorities to override a gubernatorial veto. Neither the Indi-
ana nor the Alaska Constitution provides for a pocket veto. 8
Veto Procedure
Indiana Constitution, Article 5-
Sec. 14. [If the governor does
not approve a bill] he shall return
it, with his objections, to the
House in which it shall have orig-
inated; which House shall enter
the objections, at large, upon its
journals, and proceed to recon-
sider the bill. If, after such re-
consideration, a majority of all
the members elected to that House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, with Governor's objec-
tions, to the other House, by
which it shall likewise be recon-
sidered; and, if approved by a
majority of all the members elect-
ed to that House, it shall be a
law ...
Alaska Constitution, Article II-
Sec. 15. The governor may
veto bills passed by the legislature.
He may, by veto, strike or reduce
items in appropriation bills. He
shall return any vetoed bill, with
a statement of his objections, to
the house of origin.
Sec. 16. Upon receipt of a
veto message, the legislature shall
meet immediately in joint session
and reconsider passage of the ve-
toed bill or item. Bills to raise
revenue and appropriation bills or
items, although vetoed, become
law by affirmative vote of three-
fourths of the membership of the
legislature. Other vetoed bills be-
come law by affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the membership of
the legislature..
A superficial observation of the above provisions might lead one to as-
sume that the governor of Indiana is left to the tender mercies of the
37. ALASKA CoNsT. art. II, § 14; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 25. In Alaska, the Senate
and the House have twenty and forty members respectively. ALASKA CoNsT. art. II,
§ 1. In Indiana the Senate is limited to fifty members and the House to one hundred.
IND. CoNsT. art. 4, § 2. In both states senators are elected to four year terms, one half
at each general election, and representatives are elected for a two year term. ALASKA
CoNsT. art. II, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 3.
38. Hoosiers label as a pocket-veto a practice by which the governor refuses to
accept bills in the last two days of the general assembly's session. Both constitutions,
of course, permit an affirmative veto after adjournment. The governor of Indiana has
five days following the adjournment of the general assembly to act on bills. If he vetoes
a bill during that period, he files his objections in the office of the secretary of state.
The latter is instructed by the Constitution to "lay the same before the General Assem-
bly at its next session, in like manner as if it had been returned by the Governor."
IND. CONST. art. 5, § 14. The provision in the Alaska Constitution is not so detailed
and leaves open the question whether bills vetoed after adjournment are reconsidered or
must start again through the legislative process. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 17.
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legislators." This has not been the case. The governor of Indiana has
been sufficiently influential to win support for his vetoes. From 1947
to 1955 only one major proposal was enacted into law over the execu-
tive's veto."
Special note should be given to the matter of joint legislative action
on vetoed measures under the Alaska Constitution. No doubt, as pre-
viously mentioned,"1 this provision stems largely from a sub rosa desire
for a single legislative chamber. Yet, another observation offers itself
at this time; the arrangement could very well disturb the politcal balance
which is most frequently weighted in behalf of the chief executive in the
exercise of veto powers. In other words, it may prove less difficult to
muster the necessary majorities to override vetoes in a joint session than
when the houses meet and act separately.4
In addition to the regular veto power, section 15 permits the gover-
nor of Alaska to strike items from appropriation bills. This means that
the governor can force "riders," which are frequently attached to this
type of measure, to stand on their own merits. Only the President of
the United States, the governor of Indiana, and the chief executives in
eight other states do not have the item veto.43
Hoosiers must consider whether sufficient time is given to the gov-
ernor for action on bills. The rush at legislative adjournment and the
greater complexity of modern day statutes demands a reassessment of
this matter. The governor has three days to study bills submitted to him
while the legislature is still in session, and five days after adjournment.4
39. The low plurality needed to override is one of the three criteria employed by
Professor Frank W. Prescott in assigning Indiana to the group of "weak" states in
terms of the relative strength of veto provisions. The other two criteria are the num-
ber of days which the governor has to consider bills (1) during a legislative session, and
(2) after adjournment. Prescott, supra note 29, at 100.
40. The previously mentioned "anti-secrecy" amendment, note 33 supra.
41. See note 13 sapra.
42. For purposes of bringing this point into sharper focus, assume the following
situation should arise in Alaska:
The Republicans are in control of the executive branch. During an off-year elec-
tion the Democrats win a landslide victory taking 34 of the 40 seats in the House and
8 of the 10 Senate seats up for election; the Democrats now control the Senate, 11 to
9. Suppose further a Democratic sponsored measure is vetoed by the Republican gov-
ernor
Under the veto system obtaining in most states the governor's veto would be sus-
tained, assuming partisan lines are followed, by virtue of the Republican block in the
Senate. The usual two-thirds or three-fourths plurality necessary to override the
governor could not be attained. However, in Alaska the joint session procedure permits
the votes of the more populous chamber, the House, to defeat the veto.
43. The item veto is not included among the powers of the governors of Iowa,
Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin.
9 THE BOOK OF THE STATEs, 1952-1953 103 (1952).
44. IND. Co NsT. art. 5, § 14.
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By contrast, the governor of Alaska has fifteen days, Sundays excepted,
to consider bills presented for his signature while the legislature is still
in session; if the legislature has adjourned, he has twenty days, Sundays
excepted. 5 Elsewhere the chief executive is given substantial time for
consideration.4"
The Alaska constituent assembly adopted the newer concept of ex-
ecutive control of reapportionment. The failure of legislatures to re-
apportion in accordance with constitutional dictate 7 and population
changes has led to denunciation of "rural-dominated" state legislatures.48
Alaska faces the converse of the problem: the territorial legislature has
been dominated by the several large cities. With a growth potential
which could aggravate the situation in future years, the Alaska assembly
decided upon automatic features for reapportionment and redistricting.
The constituent assembly hoped to guarantee these things by (1) placing
responsibility in the hands of the state executive and a five-man re-
apportionment board ;49 and (2) calling for reapportionment "immedi-
ately following the official reporting of each decennial census of the
United States."5 " As a further safeguard the drafters included an en-
forcement clause, enabling any qualified voter to apply "to the superior
court to compel the governor, by mandamus or otherwise, to perform his
reapportionment duties or to correct any error in redistricting or re-
apportionment."'"
Indiana has been aware of the reapportionment issue for some time."
Earlier amendments affecting the enumeration and apportionment pro-
45. ALASKA CoNsT. art. II, § 17.
46. See Lambert and McPheron, Modernizing Indiana's Constitution, 26 IND. L.J.
185, 199 (1951).
47. A recent symposium explored the problem in detail, see Legislative Reappor-
tionment, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 253 (1952).
48. Mayors Philip L. Bayt (Indianapolis) and Peter Mandich (Gary) were criti-
cal of the "rural-dominated" Indiana general assembly which has not been reappor-
tioned since 1921. See reports of their speeches to the Indiana Municipal League, Octo-
ber 2, 1957, in the Louisville Courier-Journal, October 3, 1957, § 2, p. 1, cols. 7 and 8.
Interestingly enough the "rural-dominated" general assembly of 1955 liberalized the
city annexation law. INn. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-701 to -710 (Burns 1950), as amended
(Burns Supp. 1957).
For studies pertinent to the problem in Indiana, see Note, 32 IND. L.J. 489 (1957);
SE:LTZER, ROTTEN BOROUG3xISM IN INDIANA (unpublished thesis, Department of Govern-
ment, Indiana University, 1952).
49. The five members are to be appointed by the governor on a non-partisan ba-
sis. The members may not be public officials nor employees, and each of the four
districts must be represented. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8.
50. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 3.
51. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11. Evidently Alaskans do not want to depend
solely upon "the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the
vigilance of the people ....... Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
52. See note 48 supra.
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vions in the Constitution " failed of ratification in popular referenda. 4
That Hoosiers will be faced with continuing demands for legislative re-
apportionment was apparent in a Senate resolution, favorably acted upon
by committee in the 1957 session of the general assembly, and by inti-
mations of Governor Handley and others that it will be an issue in 1959."
Any consideration of the reapportionment problem must of neces-
sity be within the context of the emotive-connoting terms advanced by
certain groups. For many political scientists and urban residents there
is but one answer to the question of reapportionment: a representative
government demands recognition of people, not territory; therefore re-
apportionment should keep pace with the farm to city movement. Re-
cently serious scholars have looked beyond the theoretical questions to
determine whether municipalities have suffered at the hands of the so-
called rural-dominated legislatures. These studies indicate that careful
consideration is given to urban problems and that representatives from
municipalities are not without influence in legislative bodies." But,
while it seems evident that urban centers have not been rendered helpless
by the absence of frequent reapportionment, there is another question
which should be considered: can a clear evasion of constitutional dictate
lead to continued reverence for constitutions and constitutionalism ?"*
53. IND. CoNsT. art. 4, §§ 4, 5.
54. The first one was defeated in September 1921 by a vote of 76,963 for, and
117,890 against. In November 1926 the second amendment lost by a smaller margin,
183,828 to 189,928. INDIANA LEGISLATIVE BUREAU, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF IN-
DIANA AND OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1954).
55. In 1957 State Senators Bontrager and Bitz introduced Senate Joint Resolution
No. 1 to amend article 4, sections 2, 4, and 5 of the Indiana Constitution. Their resolu-
tion provided for (1) the retention of the fifty senate seats and the enumeration of the
counties which would be combined into a single senatorial district; and (2) the substi-
tution of the federal decennial census for the present enumeration by the general as-
sembly. Further, while leaving primary responsibility for reapportionment in the legis-
lature, the initiators sought additional guarantees by imposing a secondary responsi-
bility on an executive committee composed of the governor, lieutenant-governor, secre-
tary of state, treasurer, and auditor.
The failure of the legislature to act on the committee's recommendation postponed
consideration on reapportionment until 1959. In the meantime, at the 1957 meeting of
the Indiana Municipal League, Governor Harold W. Handley announced that he would
ask the next assembly "to study the problem of a long-overdue reapportionment of leg-
islative seats." Louisville Courier-Journal, October 3, 1957, § 2, p. 1i cols. 7 and 8.
The Governor told newsmen that he favored a "federal" plan whereby both the rural
and urban areas would be adequately represented. Under this plan the Senate would
represent geographic areas, probably one seat for each two counties, and the House
seats would be apportioned on a population basis.
56. Such are the conclusions of Professor David Derge, Indiana University, fol-
lowing exhaustive studies of legislative voting behavior in Missouri and Illinois. Un-
published papers presented at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Ann Arbor,
April 24-26, 1958, and at the American Political Science Association meeting, St. Louis,
September 4-6, 1958.
57. This problem is discussed in the authorities collected in notes 47 and 48 supra.
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III. Executive-Administrative Relations
Brevity best describes the executive branch under the Alaska Con-
stitution. Only two state officers, the governor and secretary of state,
are elected, and even this limited selection is further reduced by the con-
stitutional stipulation that "the votes cast for a candidate for governor
shall be considered as cast also for the candidate for secretary of state
running jointly with him." 8  The intent of this limited selection is ob-
vious: Alaskans wanted to eliminate problems of a "plural executive""
by placing all executive and administrative responsibilities in the hands
of the governor. In line with this, the governor is empowered to appoint
the heads of all principal departments, subject to confirmation by a ma-
jority of the members of the legislature meeting in joint session. °
Both the historical change in the role of state executives and recent
reports of the several "Little Hoover Commissions" have influenced the
Alaska constituent assembly's decision on administrative organization.
In keeping with the current emphasis on efficiency in government, the
governor of Alaska is constitutionally empowered to reorganize the ad-
ministrative branch, to assign functions among the several administrative
units, and to issue executive orders with respect to administrative organi-
zation which are to have "the force of law."'" The legislature may re-
ject these orders, but to do so the lawmakers must act within a stipulated
period of time.62 This procedure may prove too restrictive to be a strong
check upon the governor.
Comparable powers were exercised by the governor of Indiana for
the brief span of eight years, 1933-1941. Under the leadership of Gov-
ernor McNutt the Democratic general assembly in 1933 adopted a com-
prehensive reorganization act which enhanced the position of the chief
executive as chief of the administrative department.6" In November,
1940, Governor Schricker was the only Democratic statewide candidate
to survive the Republican election victory. The general assembly in
1941 repealed the previous reorganization act, and passed in its place
two statutes which reduced the governor to a minor role, depriving him
58. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8.
59. See generally Gravlin, An Effective Chief Executive, 36 NAT'L MUNIc. REV.
137 (1947).
60. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25. The appointees serve at the pleasure of the
governor.
61. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 23. This is not a new practice; it had been recom-
mended by the Committee on State Government, and it is an established procedure in
the national government.
62. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 23.
63. Ind. Acts 1933, ch. 4, §§ 1-32, at 7-16.
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even of his appointive and removal powers.64  However, the Supreme
Court invalidated the new statutes, declaring that "the acts here in ques-
tion seek to absorb and usurp functions which are normally and generally
understood to be the functions of a Governor, and vest them in minor
administrative officers."6 The initiators of the 1941 laws won a partial
victory in that they had obtained the repeal of the McNutt reorganization
act. However, the appointing powers of the governor were restored,
and thus the situation which had prevailed before 1933 was re-established.
IV. The Judiciary
Like the older Indiana Constitution that of Alaska provides only for
a Supreme Court and courts of general jurisdiction, leaving to the legis-
lature the responsibility for creating additional ones, for prescribing
jurisdictions, and for dividing the state into judicial districts.6 The ma-
jor difference between the two states is the means for selecting judges.
A politically independent judiciary has long been an objective of
Americans. Some believe that the principle of judicial independence is
so firmly established that judges may be chosen in partisan elections.
Others contend that judicial independence is attainable only if judges are
not answerable either to the governor or party leaders. For example, the
Committee on State Government suggested that the chief justice be se-
lected for an eight-year term in a non-partisan election;" and Mis-
sourians, believing that "sometimes judges had to depend more on the
will of politicians than on their ability as judges to keep their positions,"68
provided for gubernatorial appointments from among nominees chosen
by a commission of lawyers and citizens.66
Obviously the Alaska assembly was influenced by the "Missouri
Plan" and the Model State Constitution, for it provided for appointment
of judges by nonpartisan processes. There is to be a two-step procedure:
(1) a seven-man judicial council"0 will nominate two or more qualified
64. The act which repealed the 1933 reorganization is found in Ind. Acts 1941, ch.
40, §§ 1-2, at 124-25; the administrative powers acts of 1941 are found at Ind. Acts
1941, ch. 13, §§ 1-27, at 31-48 and Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 182, §§ 1-2, at 552-54.
65. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 674, 35 N.E.2d 270, 293 (1941).
66. IND. CONST. art. 7; ALASKA CONST. art. IV.
67. MODEL STATE CoNST. art. VI, § 602; and see Mott, The Judiciary, MODEL STATE
CONST. 37 (1948).
68. MISSOURI STATE TEACHERS Ass'N, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MIssouRi 31(1946).
69. Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 29.
70. Three attorneys are to be chosen by the governing body of the state bar as-
sociation, three non-attorneys are to be appointed by the governor and confirmed by
the legislature in joint session, and the chief justice is to serve ex officio as the chair-
man. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8. The first judicial council will appoint all justices,
including the chief justice, who will then assume his seat on the council. Art. XV, § 16.
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persons7 for each court vacancy; and (2) the governor will be restricted
to a choice among those nominated. Still in keeping with the Missouri
Plan, popular approval of judges is retained. Each judge is subject to
popular approval or rejection on a non-contested ballot three years after
his appointment and at regular intervals thereafter." Indiana and a ma-
jority of the states choose their judges in partisan elections.7"
V. Popular Participation in Political Processes
By substantially adopting the Missouri Plan for selection of judges,
the Alaska convention further emphasized a trend in mid-twentieth cen-
tury political thought-the modification of Jacksonian ideas about popu-
lar sovereignty and the concomitant preoccupation with efficiency. This
has occurred despite the movement for initiative, referendum, and recall
within the past half-century.
A paradox is evident. On the one hand, there is a desire to extend
democracy; on the other hand, a fear of democracy "gone wild." An ex-
planation of this apparent contradiction is possible: early twentieth cen-
tury demands for reform or panaceas led to the extension of democracy
through initiative, referendum, and recall; however, experiences with
these devices in several states have led to the adoption of restrictions. The
Committee on State Government, calling attention to prior abuses,
warned against unlimited employment of initiative and referendum. 5
The Alaska constituent assembly was neither deaf to such warnings,
nor blind to the experiences in older states. Accordingly, two limitations
were imposed to keep these devices within bounds. First, bills to be
initiated by popular action must follow a two-step process: (1) an ap-
plication, containing the bill, must be signed by one hundred qualified
voters;76 and (2) after certifying the application the secretary of state
is to prepare a petition which must be signed "by qualified voters, equal
in number to ten per cent of those who voted in the preceding general
71. There are two constitutional stipulations regarding qualifications-United
States citizenship and a license to practice law in Alaska. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 4.
72. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
73. Superior court judges will be passed upon by the voters every six years, and
supreme court justices every tenth year. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6.
74. For current information regarding the selection and tenure of judges in the
states and territories, see 12 THE BooK OF THE STATES, 1958-1959 95, 101 (1958).
75. Certain groups have evoked criticism by initiating "controversial matters"
which are economic in nature. Stewart, The Initiative and Referendum, MODEL STATE
CONST. 29 (1948). Excellent examples of "controversial matters" initiated by interest
groups are those dealing with pension plans and other forms of old-age assistance in
California.
76. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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election and resident in at least two-thirds of the election districts .. .
There is an obvious third step that possibly should be mentioned: the
electorate must vote on the proposition in a statewide election." The
second limitation is that initiative cannot be used "to dedicate revenues,
make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of
courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special legislation."79
Nor can referenda "be applied to dedications of revenue, to appropria-
tions, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the imme-
diate preservation of public peace, health, or safety.""s
Only in a narrow sense do Hoosiers participate directly in constitu-
ent or legislative functions. The Indiana Constitution established the
electorate as a partner with the legislature in the exercise of the constitu-
ent function;81 and the lawmakers have employed advisory referenda to
measure public opinion on urgent matters.82
VI. Local Governmental Units and Powers
Although "states' rights" have been vociferously defended through-
out our history, local government, the creature of the states, was dis-
regarded during America's first hundred years. Not until 1875, when
Missouri adopted constitutional home rule,83 was the "federal" principle
first introduced within the states. Since that date forty-two other states
have provided for constitutional home rule, legislative home rule, or op-
tional law charters. Of the remaining five states, four allow home rule
in a very limited sense, granting privileges to either one city or a single
77. ALASKA CoNsT. art. XI, § 3. The provision does not stipulate what proportion
of voters in each district must sign the petition.
78. Action on the proposition will be taken at "the first statewide election held
more than one hundred twenty days after adjournment of the legislative session fol-
lowing the filing" of the petitions. The stipulation regarding time is included so that
it may be determined whether "substantially the same measure" had been enacted by the
legislature. If so, the petition is void. ALASKA CoNsT. art. XI, § 4. The Constitution
leaves open the question who will decide whether "substantially" the same measure has
been enacted.
79. ALASKA CoNST. art. XI, § 7.
80. Ibid.
81. A proposed amendment must win the support of a majority of the members of
each legislative chamber in two successive general assembly sessions, and be ratified by
a majority of the electors in a general election. IND. CoNsr. art. 16, § 1. In 1936 the
Indiana Supreme Court overturned an earlier interpretation in ruling that a majority of
electors meant a majoity of those voiing for the proposition, not a majority of the
votes cast at the election. In, re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N.E. 865 (1935). See also
Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204, 78 N.E.2d 535 (1948);
82. However, the intent of advisory referenda will be lost unless the propositions
are framed clearly. Hoosier voters can attest to this following their experience in 1956,
when they voted on four propositions regarding standard (slow) and daylight-savings(fast) time.
83. MCCANDLESS, GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN MISSOURI 11
(1949).
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class of cities. Only Indiana does not permit any degree of choice as to
the form of local government."4 The Alaska Constitution grants home
rule to first class cities and boroughs," and authorizes the legislature to
extend this privilege to other classes.8
Home rule for Indiana's cities and towns has been an issue in recent
years. In 1953, a resolution to amend the Constitution to achieve home
rule was supported by the General Assembly, 7 but upon reconsideration
in 1955, the proposal was rejected.8 Interested groups, notably the
League of Women Voters, then tried to win support for constitutional
home rule in 1957. That this attempt was unsuccessful may have been
due to the failure of the League of Women Voters and the Indiana Mu-
nicipal League to act in concert before the legislature. From recent
observations, the writer would not anticipate an abatement in pressure."
Home rule is an example of Alaska's emphasis on maximizing local
self-government; other provisions in the new constitution stress such
things as (1) a minimum of local units;" (2) the avoidance of duplica-
tion of tax-levying jurisdictions;91 and (3) a provision for inter-
governmental cooperation. Further, in regard to local government, it
should be noted that (1) taxing powers may be delegated only to cities
and organized boroughs ;" and (2) service units may be created only if
a new service cannot be provided "by an existing service area, by in-
corporation as a city, or by annexation to a city."8 4
Apparently the framers of Alaska's fundamental law were prepared
to break with an Anglo-American tradition-the county. Even the
84. Two political scientists, Edwin B. McPheron, Indiana University, and Clark
Norton, DePauw University, who were interested in home rule for Indiana cities and
towns, compiled the information herein cited.
85. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 9.
86. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 10.
87. The provision for home rule was introduced as Senate Joint Resolution No. 2
by State Senators Bontrager and Eichhorn. For action on this resolution, see IND. S.
JouR. 34, 153, 191, 218, 748, 756 (1953).
88. IND. H.R. JouR. 628-29 (1955).
89. College students seem to have found this a challenging issue which demands
urgent consideration. It was a matter of extreme interest on October 23, 1956, when
students from a number of schools listened to a home rule panel at a meeting of the
Indiana Citizenship Clearing House. And, on November 12, 1957, student "senators"
from Indiana's state and private schools showed great concern at a Model Legislative
Assembly at Indiana University. While the "senators" did not have time to act on a
home rule proposal, the responsible committee did report it out with the recommendation
that it be adopted.
90. ALASKA CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
91. Ibid.
92. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 13.
93. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 2.
94. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 5.
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name was changed to "borough. '"" Except for the express provision
for a governing body in an organized borough,9 6 the details regard-
ing classification, powers, and functions are to be determined by a future
legislature." Only time can tell whether the break from the past is a
reality or a fiction; only after the legislature acts can it be determined
whether Alaska has made changes, or whether geographic units, parad-
ing under a new name, will be clothed with the powers and functions of
traditional American counties.
VII. Finance and Taxation
Taxpayers might well wish that governments economized on spend-
ing money in the same fashion that the Philadelphia Convention econo-
mized on words. In a brief statement the framers of the United States
Constitution described the taxing, spending, and borrowing powers of
the national government, a brevity not emulated by drafters of state
constitutions. The Hoosier and Alaska constitutions are not exceptions.
Each imposes an obligation on the legislature to prescribe standards for
assessments;9" each prohibits payments from the treasury, except as
authorized by law ;9 and each provides for state.0 0 and local debt limita-
tion.'' In regard to debt limitations both states appear to have stringent
provisions:
State Debt Limitations
Indiana Constitution, Article 10-
Sec. 5. No law shall authorize
any debt to be contracted, on be-
half of the State, except in the
following cases: To meet casual
deficits in the revenue; to pay the
interest on the State debt; to re-
pel invasion, suppress insurrec-
tion, or, if hostilities be threaten-
ed, provide for the public defense.
Alaska Constitution, Article IX-
Sec. 8. No state debt shall be
contracted unless authorized by
law for capital improvements and
ratified by a majority of the
qualified voters of the State who
vote on the question. The State
may, as provided by law and with-
out ratification, contract debt for
the purpose of repelling invasion,
suppressing insurrection, defend-
ing the State in war, meeting
95. ALASKA CoNsT. art. X, § 3.
96. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 4.
97. ALASKA CoNsT. art. X, § 3.
98. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
99. ALASKA CoNsT. art. IV, § 13; IND. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
100. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 10, § 5.
101. ALASKA CoNsT. art. IX, § 9; IND. CONST. art. 13, § 1.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
natural disasters, or redeeming in-
debtedness outstanding at the
time this constitution becomes ef-
fective.
However, the Hoosier practice of creating quasi-public corporations, such
as the Toll Road Commission, and a specific statement in the Alaska
Constitution exempting public enterprises and corporations from the debt
restrictions.. 2 provide means to circumvent the constitutional prohibi-
tions. A legislative post-audit is prescribed by the Alaska Constitution 0 3
in contrast to Indiana's use of the State Board of Accounts. 4 Each con-
stitution provides for an auditor, although the means whereby he is
held responsible differ. Hoosiers elect their auditor,' while in Alaska
he is to be selected by the legislature and serves at its pleasure."0 6 While
this constitutional officer is not subservient to the governor in either
state, the Alaska Constitution prescribes that he shall report to both the
legislative body and the chief executive." 7 A further comparison of the
finance and taxation articles reveals that no proceeds from taxes or li-
censes collected:in Alaska may be earmarked for any special purpose."0
This course is possible in Indiana, e.g., the use of specified funds or spe-
cific portions for such matters as highway construction and maintenance,
public schools, and veterans' bonuses. 0 9
Income taxes, whether gross or net, corporate or individual, have
become such a fixed part of our lives that the absence of a provision
comparable to the sixteenth amendment in the United States Constitu-
tion or the 1932 amendment to the Indiana Constitution"0 makes the
Alaska Constitution more noteworthy. In time, the people of the newest
state may discover that the one provision on the taxing power"' is more
than adequate for income tax purposes. Further evidence of the greater
102. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 11.
103. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 14.
104. INn. ANN. STAT. §§ 60-201 to -251 (Burns 1951), as amended, (Bums Supp.
1957). See generally LAmBERT, THE STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTS (unpublished thesis,
Department of Government, Indiana University, 1950).
105. IND. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
106. ALASKA CoNsT. art. IX, § 14.
107. Ibid.
108. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7. There is an exception: funds may be ear-
marked "when required by the federal government for state participation in federal
programs."
109. An example of such dedicated funds is found in the act providing for a
veterans' bonus. IND. ANN. STAT. § 59-1409 (Burns 1951).
110. IND. CONST. art. 10, § 8.
111. "The power of taxation shall never be surrendered. This power shall not be
suspended or contracted away, except as provided in this article." ALASKA CONST. IX,
§ 1. At the moment, the provision must appear innocuous to the taxpayers of Alaska.
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responsibility assumed by or granted to chief executives is visible in this
provision of the Alaska Constitution:
The governor shall submit to the legislature, at a time fixed
by law, a budget for the next fiscal year setting forth all pro-
posed expenditures and anticipated income of all departments,
offices, and agencies of the State. The governor, at the same
time, shall submit a general appropriation bill to authorize the
proposed expenditures, and a bill or bills covering recommen-
dations in the budget for new or additional revenues.112
While the governor of Indiana does not enjoy the privileged position of
his counterpart in Alaska, he is not without influence in the matter of
the budget. Indiana uses a legislative-executive budget committee com-
posed of a director and four legislative members who are appointees of
the governor. 3
VIII. The Amending Processes
Perhaps the ideal constitution, when discovered, will answer the old
question of achieving a balanced arrangement of political stability and
change. The drafters of the United States Constitution placed the em-
phasis on stability by devising an amending process which was difficult
of attainment. This difficulty is apparent from the fact that the United
States Constitution has been amended only twenty-two times in 180
years. Moreover, the amendments appear in clusters." 4  One may fur-
ther emphasize the difficulty of amending the United States Constitution
by pointing to the thousands of proposals made in the past 180 years.
Even so important a question as presidential disability is left to chance,
with only an occasional flurry of excitement-and rash of resolutions-
occurring when the President becomes ill. Yet this difficulty has been
overcome. The vitality of the United States Constitution is in the flexi-
bility of its provisions which adjust to time and change without extensive
112. ALASKA CONsT. art. IX, § 12.
113. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-412 (Burns Supp. 1957). In practice the governor ap-
points one Republican and one Democrat from each house. Neither of the states have
resolved the problem which faces a newly-inaugurated governor. He is not in a position
to assist in the preparation of the budget after his November election and before the
January meeting of the general assembly. This becomes a doubly important problem
in Indiana where biennial budgets are prepared.
114. The first ten, the Bill of Rights, were in force in 1791, two years after the
Constitution took effect. Amendments XI and XII were proclaimed in 1798 and 1804.
Then a sixty-year gap occurs before the Civil War amendments, the thirteenth, four-
teenth and fifteenth, were adopted. The sixteenth and seventeenth amendments were
proclaimed in 1913; the eighteenth and nineteenth in 1919 and 1920; and the twentieth
and twenty-first in 1933. The most recent one, the twenty-second, became a part of
the Constitution in 1951.
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amendment. Drafters of some state constitutions, notably the Cali-
fornians and Louisianans, moved to the opposite extreme, placing empha-
sis on easily changed documents. The constitutions of California and
Louisiana have each been amended over three hundred times.
The Hoosier amending process must be included among the more
difficult ones. A resolution to amend the Constitution must have the
support of a majority of the members of the general assembly in two
successive sessions and win the approval of the people in the next general
election.'15 Amendments to the Alaska Constitution need the support of
two-thirds of each legislative chamber and a majority of the votes cast in
a referendum." 6 In a related matter, revision, the Alaska constituent
assembly went far beyond its Hoosier counterpart of the previous cen-
tury. The drafters did not claim for themselves occult powers in writ-
ing a basic law. Taking seriously Jefferson's admonition that each
generation should frame its own constitution, the assembly provided for
the possibility of a constitutional convention every ten years: (1) the
legislature is authorized to call conventions "at any time" ;1 (2) if no
convention is called in any ten-year period, the secretary of state is in-
structed to "place on the ballot for the next general election the question:
'Shall there be a Constitutional Convention?' "18 Indiana does not have
a similar constitutional mandate. However, if the people of Indiana
believe that their present constitution does not provide a framework in
which change and development can take place to meet the increasing de-
mands for governmental services, they have, in the words of the Supreme
Court of Indiana, "the right to amend or change their form of govern-
ment.""'
IX. Conclusion
The Alaska Constitution is the product of a rugged, frontier com-
munity; yet its content fits a modern day, complex, industrial society.
It combines the experience of other states with contemporary ideas on
constitution-making, tradition with innovation, and the classical with the
modern. While certain of its provisions are peculiar to the special situa-
tions in Alaska, this basic law may well serve as a model for constitutional
revision in older states. Perhaps the Alaska Constitution has most nearly
approximated the ideal. This, of course, cannot be foretold from a mere
survey of content. If the Alaska Constitution lends itself to change and
115. IND. CONST. art. 16, § 1; see note 80 supra.
116. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
117. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
118. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
119. Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 539, 116 N.E. 921, 923 (1917).
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development, if it does not become an obstruction to effective and re-
sponsible government, if it answers other questions posed by those who
seek the ideal, then it may well become a model state constitution.
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